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THE REYNOLDS STANDARD AND LOCAL REAPPORTIONMENT
JOSEPHINE Y. KING*
I. FoREWoRD
S INCE the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr,' a groundswell of
litigation has thrust the courts into the political arena.2 Preceding the
landmark opinion in Reynolds v. Sims3 a brace of Georgia cases 4 brought forth
two principles. The first is that all voters within an election district must count
equally; the second is that election districts must be composed of substantially
equal numbers. Congressional representation systems failing to meet these cri-
teria were declared unconstitutional under article I, section 2 of the federal
constitution.
Next to be attacked were the state legislatures,5 heavily weighted as they
are in favor of rural representation. But in these cases, the courts have chosen
as the constitutional measuring rod an innovation of the equal protection clause
and have cast the issue in terms of a civil right rather than due process or a
guarantee of republican government.0 Profound analysis of the Supreme Court's
decisions as they affect constitutional theory and the science of democratic gov-
ernment is called for.7 What is attempted here is to capture at a moment of
time, the reflections upon local waters of federal and state reapportionment
decisions and to offer some conclusions and caveats.
The revolutionary effects of the Reynolds standard8 as it penetrates the
vitals of county boards and city councils go far beyond problems of public
administration and governmental organization. For we are in the realm of a
right of the governed-a constitutional right to cast a vote of equal weight.
But in implementing that right by an inflexible mathematical standard, do we
lose sight of other considerations such as the virility of our two-party system and
* Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, State University of New York. The author
expresses appreciation to Professor J. D. Hyman of the School of Law and to Milton Alpert,
Counsel, N.Y. Office for Local Government for their comments and assistance during the
preparation of this paper. They, however, share no responsibility for errors of commission or
omission.
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See Atleson, The Aftermath of BAxcm v. CAxu--an Adventure
in Judicial Experimentation, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 535 (1963); McKay, Political Thickets and
Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 645 (1963). See
Annot., Inequalities in the population of election districts or voting units as rendering ap-
portionment unconstitutional--Federal Cases, 12 L. Ed. 2d 1282 (1965).
2. For the Court's earlier concern to avoid the political thicket, see Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
3. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
4. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) and Wesbury v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
5. For the litigation pertaining to New York State, see infra, Part III.
6. Dixon, Reapportionment Perspectives: What is Fair Representation?, 51 A.B.A.J.
319 (1965) and Recent Developments in Reapportionment, Address Before the Conference
of Chief Justices (Aug. 6, 1964).
7. Ibid.; Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties
and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 21 (1965).
8. For a pre-Reynolds discussion of standards, see Dixon, Apportionment Standards
and Judicial Power, 38 Notre Dame Law. 367 (1963).
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effective representation of minority interests? Quantitative equality of represen-
tation can be satisfied by at-large elections or multi-member districts, which
could, however, under the winner-take-all rule, emaciate an opposition party
and checkmate minority groups. Qualitative equality of representation would
seem to require a system of single-member districts, built upon historic, geo-
graphic and socio-economic communities of interest. Such a system easily runs
aground when battered by mathematical tests, for counties, villages and towns
have grown up unaware of the requirement that their population should conform
to exact multiples of a representational norm.
The difficult decision in drawing up a representation plan is one of district-
ing, for it is not too onerous to decide the other variable elements.9 To avoid the
frustration of a redistricting which conforms to mathematical equality tests but
which makes no sense politically, reapportioning bodies have tried fractional and
weighted voting. These devices, in turn, raise questions of democratic theory and
practice.
It is not surprising that local governments have resisted the task of re-
apportionment. Erie County, to which specific references will be made in the
succeeding discussion, is no exception. Its Board of Supervisors, representing
with equal weight densely populated urban areas and sparsely populated rural
regions, illustrates an advanced stage of malapportionment. Redistricting is the
paramount problem.' 0
But as this county and other local governments work out a solution accept-
able to the courts, one cannot close the book and ignore the larger issue raised.
Political theorists and constitutional lawyers who watch the movement of the
law, must sense the creative development which the equal protection clause is
now undergoing. If the ultimate goal is fair, effective representation, then the
present re-structuring to achieve equal representation is but a first step.
II. ELEMENTS OF A REPRESENTATION PLAN
In devising a plan of representation, the responsible legislative body must
first reach a decision on each of the several variable components of an overall
scheme. It must decide the size of the legislature, the basis of representation, the
kind(s) of districts and the "power" of each legislator's vote.
Basis of Representation
Population as the mathematical sum of individuals within a governmental
unit is the fundamental concept on which apportionment is based. At least four
variations of the population base may be cited.
Census population is the total of all inhabitants within the unit, e.g., within
the state or county. Unquestionably, this is a valid starting point for allocating
legislative representation.
9. See infra, Part II.
10. See Proposed Plans I & II for redistricting Erie County towns, in the Appendix.
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Citizen population is census population exclusive of aliens. New York State
has utilized citizen population since 1894.11 Two of the apportionment plans
offered by the special session of the state legislature (December, 1964) were
based on citizen population.' 2 The Supreme Court in WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo'
3
expressed no opinion on New York's use of citizen population. The three-judge
district court, to which the case was remanded, observed that the present method
of enumeration "affects all areas of the state substantially equally" and there-
fore produces no discriminatory results.' 4 Consequently, at the present time, a
citizen population base appears acceptable to the courts.'5,
A third classification of population is derived from the number of enrolled
voters-those registered by the appropriate board of elections. Both the Citizens'
Committee' 6 and the Joint Legislative Committee17 suggested this basis. But
the three-judge district court in WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo declared the invalidity
of an enrolled voter base at least for purposes of New York state legislative
apportionment.' 8
Lastly, voting population, i.e., enrolled voters who exercised their franchise
in the last presidential or gubernatorial election, has been advanced as a proper
basis for representation. The Joint Legislative Committee strongly preferred
the actual-voter measure' 9 and argued that it achieved a one-man, one-vote
result. Thus, if there were two districts of equal population, each entitled to one
representative, and if in the first district 50 per cent of the population voted
while in the second district 25 per cent voted, then twice as many votes were
required to elect the representative of the first district. Reapportionment would
give the first district an additional representative. The three-judge federal court
11. N.Y. Const. art. III, §§ 4, 5.
12. See infra, p. 130. The New York Citizens' Committee on Reapportionment observed
that citizen population has been traditionally utilized in New York, and that there may be,
at the present time, an insufficient disparity between the numbers of citizens and residents to
warrant the additional cost of a citizen census. But the Committee recommended that the
citizen base be re-evaluated before a permanent plan is devised. N.Y. Citizens' Committee on
Reapportionment, Report to Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller 13-14 (1964) (hereinafter cited
as Citizens' Comm. Rep.).
The joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment, however, regarded a citizen base
as the only acceptable alternative to a voter base which was its first preference. N.Y. Joint
Legislative Comm. on Reapportionment, Report, Leg. Doc. No. 76, at 7-9 (1964) (hereinafter
cited as Legislative Comm. Rep.).
13. 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
14. 238 F. Supp. 916, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). For subsequent litigation involving reap-
portionment of the N.Y. legislature, see Hughes v. WVCA, Inc., 379 U.S. 694 (1965);
Glinski v. Lomenzo, 16 N.Y.2d 27, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (1965), Travia v. Lomenzo,
- F. Supp. - (- 1965), aff'd, - U.S. -, 85 S. Ct. 1582 (1965).
15. See Seaman v. Fedourich, 45 Misc. 2d 940, 258 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Sup. Ct. 1965)
(legislative reapportionment case, admitting as evidence of population only the federal census
figures and requiring that state hospital inmates be included in the district totals).
16. Citizens' Comm. Rep. 6.
17. Legislative Comm. Rep. 8.
18. 238 F. Supp. 916, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The federal district court in Hawaii, how-
ever, in disapproving a state senatorial reapportionment plan did not disagree with the use
of a registered voter base but invalidated the plan for other reasons, Holt v. Richardson,
240 F. Supp. 724, 727 (D. Hawaii, 1965). See also Ellis v. Mayor & City Council of Balti-
more, 234 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md. 1964); Buckley v. Hoff, 243 F. Supp. 873 (D. Vt. 1965).
19. Legislative Comm. Rep. 7.
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did not find this reasoning persuasive. It invalidated two of the four plans pro-
posed by the New York legislature because their actual-voter base would operate
to disadvantage populous areas and produce imbalance rather than correct it. 20
Districting
Having decided the basis on which the allocation of representatives is to be
predicated, the apportioning authority must next draw the districts and decide
the method of counting representative votes.
All the legislators might be elected at-large from one multi-member dis-
trict.2 The practical financial problems of running a county-wide campaign would
arouse objections from political parties to such a plan. Secondly, the electorate
would be faced with long and confusing ballots. Furthermore, it is problematic
whether a legislator so elected would be accepted as "representative" in the tradi-
tional sense, where the separate voices of cities and towns have long been
heard in county deliberations.
Election at-large might be made more palatable if the county-taking Erie
as an illustration-were subdivided into at least two Buffalo and two town dis-
tricts with a certain number of representatives elected by each of the four dis-
tricts. Again, this would run counter to the individual spirit of the towns and to
the concept that there be a clear nexus between the representative and the elec-
torate he represents.
The operation of a system of large, multi-member districts raises important
problems in democratic government 2 Not only is a legislative body chosen from
such districts less likely to represent social, economic, geographic or racial inter-
ests of significant (though not majority) proportions, but also it makes even
more indirect the relationship between the governed and the government by the
interposition of middlemen-legislators who do not reflect their constituencies.
Multi-member districting, furthermore, may have serious consequences for our
two-party system. This system which has proven to be the keystone of stable,
democratic government in the United States cannot operate effectively where
one party, though possessing a majority in certain districts is consistently swept
aside in at-large elections 3
Thus far the courts have not expressed a conclusive evaluation of a multi-
member district system.24 A representation plan composed of both multi-member
and single-member districts was approved by the Supreme Court in a recent
opinion, Fortson v. Dorsey, containing some dictum which may prove prospec-
20. 238 F. Supp. 916, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
21. See Weinstein, supra note 7, at 46-48.
22. Dixon, supra note 6, at 323.
23. For the same reason, it is not suggested that proportional representation be em-
ployed as a substitute for the single-member district system of representation since the former
may produce a fractionalization of parties resulting in weak and divided opposition and/or
an insecure coalition in power.
24. See Holt v. Richardson, 240 F. Supp. 724 (D. Hawaii 1965).
123
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tively meaningful 2 5 The three-judge district court in Pennsylvania, however, has
raised the issue of the constitutional right to subdistricting.26 Therefore, although
a range of choice for types of districting is still open to the authors of new repre-
sentation plans, future developments may narrow the range.
A pattern of districts could be laid out for a county-using a single-member
or single- and multi-member districts-which totally disregards present town and
city boundaries. Thus a purely numerical calculation of equal population seg-
ments could be employed to redistrict a county. This would seem an undesirable
alternative. The district electorate might be composed of fragments of several
governmental units with the result that the representative might be unrepresenta-
tive of any or all of them. Furthermore, the necessary liaison between county
and town or county and city in carrying out certain functions, e.g., health,
zoning, protection, finance, would be destroyed or at least impaired. A more
efficient and acceptable system would be to reconcile population districting with
present political boundaries by groupings of smaller, contiguous units.
Whether as strong a case can be made for town lines as is made for the
inviolability of counties is open to question. The county has been the favored
child in New York systems of representation. Since the first state constitution
of 1777 the county has been protected as an entity. The retention of county
lines is based on historic and functional considerations. The important, wide
range of governmental duties of the county are discussed in the New York
Citizens' Committee report.27 The present constitutional state apportionment
provides that each county (with the exception of Fulton and Hamilton) is en-
titled to at least one Assemblyman. Senate districting is founded on the county
unit although some multi-county districts are provided. The theory that preser-
vation of the county as a basic unit of state apportionment deters gerrymandering
has also been advanced. But the caveat of Reynolds v. Sims,28 that the integrity
of political subdivisions must yield to district equality, should not be ignored. On
the functional basis, the town has a much weaker claim to necessary political
individuality, although historically it, like the county, has maintained its identity.
Voting
In addition to deciding the basis of representation and the geographical
boundaries of districts, the authors of a reapportionment plan must determine
the voting power of each legislator. Either in conjunction with present city wards,
city and town voting districts, or with newly drawn districts, one of several
methods of assigning votes to county legislators may be adopted. Each legislator
may be given one vote or a weighted vote or a fractional vote. If the present
25. See infra, p. 129.
26. Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310, 326 (M.D. Pa.), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 379 U.S. 40 (1964); see also Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A.2d 556
(Sup. Ct. Pa. 1964).
27. Op. cit. supra, note 12, at 112-23.
28. 377 U.S. 533, 580-81 (1964).
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hiumber of Erie county legislators is maintained, and they continue to be elected
by the present constituencies, representatives of the more populous areas must
be assigned extra (weighted) votes in proportion to the least populous electoral
unit.
From the point of view of democratic theory, such a system may be chal-
lenged. One elected official with five or ten votes does not necessarily represent
the various interests of his community. His deviation from the ideal, composite
representative is magnified by the extra votes he casts and he may distort rather
than reflect the views of his district.
The court in WMCA declined to evaluate the validity of weighted voting
at the county level; 29 but other judicial signposts point to an ultimate pro-
nouncement that this method is unconstitutional. 30°
Fractional voting permits each existing district to elect at least one legis-
lator. A unit of population is selected as the basis for one vote. Districts en-
compassing multiples of one unit elect as many members as they have units. A
district possessing less than one unit of population would have a proportionate
fraction of one vote. Thus if the unit were 10,000, a district of 5,000 would
return one legislator with one-half vote; a district of 20,000 would return'two
legislators each with one full vote.
Fractional voting presents problems in the area of democratic representa-
tion. Does the legislator with one-half or one-quarter vote-who has a full voice
in committee decisions, etc.--"over-represent" his electorate?
Although the Citizens' Committee31 and the Joint Legislative Committee32
saw merit in fractional voting, the court in WMCA did not condone its use at
the state level. The criticism that fractional voting over-emphasizes rural repre-
sentation may be lodged at the county as well as the state level. Therefore, frac-
tional voting and weighted voting appear to be legally uncertain devices on which
to predicate a reapportionment scheme.
The foregoing consideration of the alternative choices in base of representa-
tion, districting and voting should suggest that the judicial edict of one-man,
one-vote cannot be translated into practical politics simply by dividing a unit
into squares each with exactly X number of citizens or people. Inevitably, there
is pressure to maintain as much of the status-quo as possible, and to argue the
justification of large or small deviations from the judicial standard. For the
leeways, if there are any, one must examine the decisions of the federal and state
courts in the cases testing different schemes of apportionment.
III. THE STANDARD UNFURLED
A review of the abundant literature following in the wake of Baker v. Cart3
is not within the scope of this paper. Rather, attention will be directed to the
29. 238 F. Supp. 916, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
30. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Meyers, 231 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Wash. 1964).
31. Op. cit. supra note 12, at 39-40.
32. Op. cit. supra note 12, at 11.
33. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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comments of the courts bearing upon the application of the new constitutional
standard to local representation.
Reynolds v. Sims3 4 transmuted the equal congressional districts rule of
Wesberry v. Sanders35 to an equal state legislative districts rule, commanded by
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. And it is the equal pro-
tection clause which has provided the nucleus for the many apportionment de-
cisions post-dating Reynolds. Reynolds laid down a constitutional standard:
".. . the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis,"3 6 While
refuting an intent to insist on mathematical exactitude in compliance with its
standard, the court after raising "other considerations," nonetheless, recapitulates
with but minor variations its dominant population theme.
Two aspects of the opinion which have been seized upon as possible mitiga-
tions of the standard in its application to cities and counties are the flexibility
and political subdivisions "concessions." 37 It has been ventured that the courts
may demand less punctiliousness in districting for state as contrasted with fed-
eral legislators; deviations from a numbers standard might be tolerated where
vindicated by a rational state policy.38
Secondly, the Court recognized that local governmental entities are often
required to perform important functions and that it may be sensible to maintain
the integrity of these units in formulating legislative districts. Preservation of
natural and historic boundaries appeared to the court a valid alternative to
"indiscriminate" districting, the latter affording "an open invitation to partisan
gerrymandering." 39 It might be permissible, said the court, to preserve the in-
dividual voices of political subdivisions in one house of a state legislature. 40
Neither of these theoretical meliorations has been accepted thus far in an
apportionment case. At the same time that the Reynolds majority seemed to
allow some leeway for the representation of political subdivisions, it took no ex-
ception to the district court's view that counties were "merely involuntary
political units ... created ... to aid in the administration of state government." 41
And, in language which may be marshalled in rebuttal to the demands of local
units for special consideration, the Court warned:
But if, even as a result of a clearly rational state policy of according
some legislative representation to political subdivisions, population is
submerged as the controlling consideration in the apportionment of
seats in the particular legislative body, then the right of all the State's
citizens to cast an effective and adequately weighted vote would be un-
constitutionally impaired.
42
34. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
35. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
36. 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
37. Id. at 578-80.
38. Id. at 579.
39. Ibid.
40. Id. at 578.
41. Id. at 548.
42. Id. at 581.
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The other decisions which were handed down with Reynolds (Alabama)
on June 15, 1964 upset the apportionment schemes in New York, Maryland,
Virginia, Delaware and Colorado.48 In reading the June 15 cases and considering
the ten memorandum decisions that followed on June 22,44 what authority can
be found for exempting a county or city reapportionment from total compliance
with the mathematical standard of Reynolds? What judicial tests have been
applied?
In the Virginia case, Davis v. Mann,45 two additional factors were con-
sidered. The population basis used in the allocation of legislative seats could not
be adjusted to exclude temporary residents (here military personnel concentrated
in a few districts). Secondly, an intent to balance urban and rural interests would
not exonerate or validate a numerical malapportionment.
In Roman v. SinCock46 as in Tawes,47 the Court observed that the state legis-
lature has authority to enact a stop-gap plan pending permanent revision of
apportionment to accord with the one-man, one-vote principle.
The Colorado case is noteworthy for two declarations of the Court. In eval-
uating a reapportionment of the lower chamber (by state constitutional amend-
ment), the Court found that a population-variance ratio of 1.7:1 and a voters-
electing-a-majority proportion of 45.1 per cent indicated that the Colorado
House was at least arguably apportioned on a population basis.48 None of the
other June 15 decisions had spoken in such specific terms. Secondly, the Court
made it clear that notwithstanding the electorate's approval of the Colorado re-
apportionment amendment, the resulting plan was not invulnerable to the Court's
censure. (By virtue of the amendment, the House had been realigned to meet
the population test, but the Senate, reflecting geographic and sociologic factors
as well as population, had been retained as previously constituted.) The Court
insisted that both houses must be representative of population.
The opinion in Meyers v. Thigpen,49 one of the memorandum decisions,
reaffirmed the Lucas declaration of the Court's power to override the "voice of
the people" of a state even when expressed through initiative referendum and
constitutional amendment. "An individual's constitutionally protected right to
cast an equally weighted vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a majority
43. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman
v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377
U.S. 713 (1964).
44. Beadle v. Scholle, 377 U.S. 990 (1964); Marshall v. Hare, 378 U.S. 561 (1964);
Hearne v. Smylie, 378 U.S. 563 (1964); Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964); Hill
v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (1964); Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554 (1964); Williams v. Moss,
378 U.S. 558 (1964); Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S. 553 (1964); Nolan v. Rhodes, 378 U.S. 556
(1964); Germano v. Kerner, 378 U.S. 560 (1964).
45. 377 U.S. 678 (1964).
46. 377 U.S. 695 (1964).
47. 377 U.S. 696 (1964).
48. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 730 (1964). For
a description of these mathematical tests, see infra, Part IV.
49. 378 U.S. 554 (1964).
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of a State's electorate .... ."50 The other decisions of June 22, 1964 affecting the
state legislatures of Florida, Illinois, Oklahoma, Idaho, Connecticut, Michigan,
Iowa, and Ohio did not bring to light any permissible deviations from the
population standard of Reynolds.51
A more recent Supreme Court opinion emphasizes the hegemony of the
mathematical standard enthroned by the June, 1964 decisions. Before the appeal
was decided, Dorsey v. Fortson52 had, together with Drew v. Scranton," seemed
to sound the knell for multi-member districts at least where such districts were
used side by side with single-member districts. The district court had held that
it was unconstitutional to elect state senators at large in two-thirds of the dis-
tricts whereas other senators were elected from individual senatorial districts.
The case was initiated by the minority party in the belief that subdistricting
would enhance its opportunity to elect a few legislators. It was urged that at-
large voting operated to cancel out minority representation.
Mr. Justice Brennan in the opinion delivered in January, 1965 limited
the issue of equal protection to
whether county-wide voting in the seven multi-district counties results
in denying the residents therein a vote "approximately equal in weight
to that of" voters resident in the single-member constituencies ...
[W]e cannot say that it does. There is clearly no mathematical dis-
parity. Fulton County, the State's largest constituency, has a population
nearly seven times larger than that of a single-district constituency and
for that reason elects seven senators.5
4
Even though under the system used in the counties containing more than
one senatorial district, the senatorial nominees were required to be residents of
the district they sought to represent, Justice Brennan stated that such senators
were the "county's and not merely the district's senator." Therefore, the con-
tention that the choice of the population of one district might be swept aside in
the county-wide vote did not trouble the court. The mathematical standard hav-
ing been satisfied, arguments directed toward effective or fair representation
seemed irrelevant.
The Pennsylvania case 5 is at variance with the final Dorsey result, indi-
cating that there may be a protected right to subdistricting. In a measure, this
is what the challenging voters were arguing for in Dorsey by their contention
that the county-wide, multi-district system in Georgia suppressed racial and
political minorities. These cases raise the issue of gerrymandering, which appears
50. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964).
51. For a criticism of the Court's pre-occupation with mathematics, see Dixon, Recent
Developments in Reapportionment, Address Before the Conference of Chief Justices (Aug. 6,
1964).
52. 228 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ga. 1964), rev'd, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
53. 229 F. Supp. 310 (M.D. Pa. 1964), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 379
U.s. 40 (1964).
54. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1965), reversing, 228 F. Supp. 259 (N.D.
Ga. 1964).
55. Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310 (M.D. Pa. 1964).
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in the New York supreme court decision, Matter of Orans,5 6 and which was
central to Wright v. Rockefeller.
57
But Dorsey did not foreclose the possibility of future judicial examination
of a constitutional right to effective representation. Justice Brennan conceded
the following: "It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member
constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case,
would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population. When this is demonstrated it will be time
enough to consider whether the system still passes constitutional muster."58
Does this mean that multi-member districts in a heterogenous community may
become constitutionally perilous once the issue has been formulated more con-
vincingly than it was in Wright v. Rockefeller? As a refinement of the population
standard, or as a separate requirement, the single-member district system may
be emerging from the equal protection clause.
New York State Reapportionment
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo59 involved a challenge to the constitutional appor-
tionment of the New York state legislature.
The Supreme Court, finding a "... . significant undervaluation of the weight
of votes of certain ... citizens merely because of where they happen to reside"
60
held that the New York constitutional scheme was invalid under the equal pro-
tection clause. It contained:
a built-in bias against voters living in the State's more populous coun-
ties. And the legislative representation accorded to the urban and sub-
urban areas becomes proportionately less as the population of those
areas increases."'
The majority reiterated the principle laid down in Reynolds: ". . . the Equal
Protection clause requires that seats in both houses of a bicameral state legis-
lature must be apportioned substantially on a population basis." 62
56. 45 Misc. 2d 616, 257 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct.'New York County 1965), affirmed, 15
N.Y.2d 339, 206 N.E.2d 854, 258 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1965).
57. 376 U.S. 52 (1964). See Comment, 59 Nw. L. Rev. 500 (1964).
58. 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965), reversing 228 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
59. 377 U.S. 633 (1964). Plaintiffs, citizens residing in Kings, Bronx, Nassau, New York
and Queens counties brought an action against state and local officials in federal district
court on May 1, 1961. They alleged that article III, sections 2 to 5, of the New York Con-
stitution was violative of the fourteenth amendment by providing for a legislative apportion-
ment which underrepresented the populous areas of the state. The district court acceded to
plaintiff's request to convene a three-judge district court. The latter dismissed the complaint
on the ground that the issues were nonjusticiable. WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 202 F. Supp. 741
(1962). On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the dismissal and remanded in the light of
Baker v. Carr. WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 370 U.S. 190 (1962). Following a hearing, the district
court dismissed the complaint on the merits holding that the system of state legislative ap-
portionment in New York was not unconstitutional. WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp.
368 (1962). Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.
60. 377 U.S. 633, 653 (1964).
61. Id. at 654.
62. Id. at 653.
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On remand, the district court issued an order on June 27, 1964 declaring
the state apportionment scheme void, providing for 1964 elections under the
present system but limiting the term of the legislators elected to one year, and
requiring that the legislature enact a valid reapportionment by April 1, 1965
to be implemented in the elections of November, 1965.
Pursuant to the order, the New York legislature passed the Reapportion-
ment Compliance Act 63 on December 22 and 23, 1964 which contained the
following four plans:
Size of Population Voting System
Plan Senate Assembly Basis Senate Assembly
A 65 165 1960 citizen One per One per
population member member
B 65 180 1962 voters One per One per
for governor member member
C 65 186 1960 citizen One per 147 members with a full
population member vote; 39 members with
votes of 1/6 to 3/4.
D 65 174 1962 voters One per 127 members with a full
for governor member vote; 47 members with
votes of 1/6 to 3/4.
The Legislature preferred Plan D and intended this to be the law.
The three-judge district court denied motions to stay or enjoin state court
proceedings relating to the Reapportionment Compliance Act and to declare the
invalidity of the Act under the New York constitution. Judge Waterman de-
clining to rule on the allegation of political gerrymandering, limited the issues to
the equal protection considerations and the population standard of Reynolds.
The question before him was "whether a vote for assemblyman or senator in one
district is debased or diluted in relation to a vote for assemblyman or a senator
in another district .... -64
The district court invalidated Plans C and D on the grounds that fractional
voting did not comport with the fourteenth amendment. The "basic standard of
equality" would be violated where a representative with one-sixth of a vote could
fully participate in debates, committee work and party caucuses. "The Assembly-
man who represents only one-sixth of a district can theoretically give each con-
stituent six times as much representation in these respects as the Assemblyman
who represents a full district." 65 This full "unit of participation" despite frac-
tional voting power, was, under the two Plans, granted only to the sparsely
populated counties. The court noted that New York City and Nassau County
(which seem to have been the yardsticks in the federal cases) did not enjoy
these apparent advantages of fractional representation. But in footnote 2 of the
opinion, the court stated: "We express no opinion on the use of fractional or
63. N.Y.L. 1964, chs. 976, 977, 978, 979, 981.
64. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); see Hughes v.
WMCA, Inc., 379 U.S. 694 (1965).
65. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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weighted voting either as a temporary device to remedy malapportionment or in
governmental organs below the state level." 66
The court invalidated Plans B and D because of their provision for an
actual-voter base. This aspect of the Plans would operate to reduce New York
City's representation in the legislature, raising an "inference of discrimination
against city-dwellers." Footnote 3 added, however: "We express no opinion on
the validity of a voter basis under other circumstances."
67
Applying the Supreme Court tests of population-variance and minimum
percentage required to elect a majority of legislators, the court found for Plan A
that the former produced a ratio of 1.15:1 for the Senate and 1.21:1 for the As-
sembly, and the latter yielded 49.4 per cent for the Senate and 49.3 per cent for
the Assembly. Next, the court tested the allocation of representatives under Plan
A with a mathematically exact distribution, and found that there was a high de-
gree of correlation. The Plan appeared to "pass" the mathematical tests extremely
well.68
To summarize what may be learned from the courts' reasoning in the federal
cases bearing directly on the New York situation, one may venture that: (1)
the judiciary is alert to the "built-in bias" in this state against populous areas
and, consequently, it cannot be presumed that indications of such bias at the
county level will be ignored; (2) while there has been no ruling on fractional
or weighted voting except on the state level, the general arguments attacking
such procedures apply with equal validity to county legislatures; (3) a voter
base for apportionment at the county level may yield the same discriminatory
results obtained for the state, and would therefore constitute a precarious foun-
dation for a county plan.
IV. TESTS FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE SUPREME COURT STANDARD
The controlling standard for election of Congressmen and of state senators
and assemblymen is that every resident within the boundaries of the state must
be able to exercise an equal vote. The general, pre-Reynolds standards affecting
representation plans are also operative; for example, the compactness of districts,
the contiguity of territories contained in a district, the "good faith" (public-
mindedness, objectivity, intelligent judgment) of the body charged with formu-
lating apportionment and districting systems.69 The good faith standard has
been applied without difficulty by the courts to disapprove a proposed districting
which was geared to the self-preservation of incumbents. 70
66. Id. at 924.
67. Id. at 925.
68. Id. at 927. For discussion of these mathematical tests, see infra, Part IV.
69. The court in Holt v Richardson, 240 F. Supp. 724, 730 (D. Hawaii 1965) elabo-
rated upon the "factors" which a reapportioning body should weigh: "... . community of
interests, community of problems, socio-economic status, political and racial factors-each
and all must be considered, and ... the sum total of all of the districting must result in sub-
stantial equality of meaningful representation to each and all of the voters of the State."
70. See, e.g., id. at 731; League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 242 F. Supp. 357,
360, 361 (D. Neb. 1965).
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The new equal representation standard, however, has given birth to mathe-
matical tests. Three have recurred with increasing frequency in the decisions of
this last year. The first is the population variance ratio (X: 1). The most pop-
ulous district (X) is compared with the least populous district (1) to determine
the maximum difference in population represented by one legislative seat or vote.
Thus if X equals 100,000 and 1 equals 10,000, the ratio is 10:1. The most
populous district has ten times as many persons to be represented by one legis-
lator as the least populous. Stated another way, a resident of the smallest dis-
trict has a vote "worth" ten times as much as a resident of the largest. A perfectly
apportioned legislature would yield a ratio of 1:1.
A second test is based on deviations from a representational norm.71 Given
the total population of a state (or county, etc.) and the number of legislative
seats to be apportioned, the norm (average population per legislator) is obtained
by simple division. The norm equals 100 per cent and the suggested, permissible
range of deviation is 85 per cent to 115 per cent or -- 15 per cent.
72
Thirdly, the courts have applied what may be termed the least percentage
capable of electing a majority of legislators test. To determine this percentage,
one must arrange districts in order from the least to the most populous. District
populations, beginning with the least populous district, are accumulated until a
majority of legislative seats has been reached. This cumulative sub-total divided
by the total population indicates the smallest percentage which technically could
control the legislature. A perfectly apportioned legislature would yield approxi-
mately 50 per cent.
Another "test" (or perhaps better termed a composite criterion) which
the courts have employed is an evaluation of the overall effect of a plan, whether
discrepancies in apportionment of one house are balanced in the other or whether
deviations are cumulatively exacerbated rather than minimized. 73 This need to
evaluate the "totality" of a representative scheme is frequently expressed in the
cases, but the bases on which the court's judgment should be formulated are not
firmly established.
The courts applying a population variance ratio refer back to the Lucas
case for the spare guidance offered by the Supreme Court. The opinion expressed
in Lucas was that a ratio of 1.7:1 for the Colorado House was arguably satis-
factory compliance with the principle of equal protection.7 4 The Reynolds de-
,cision indicates that a 2:1 ratio would be an unconstitutional dilution of the
71. This test was advocated by political scientists fourteen years ago, see 45 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 154-55 (1951).
72. H.R. 5505, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965) provides that: "Each such [Congressional]
district shall at all times be composed of contiguous territory, in as compact form as prac-
ticable; . . . no district established in any State for the Ninetieth or any subsequent Congress
shall contain . . . more than 15 per centum greater or less than the average [district popula-
tion] . . . ." The bill was passed by the House; hearings have been held on it in the Senate.
73. League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 242 F. Supp. 357, 360-61 (D. Neb.
1965). See also Holt v. Richardson, 240 F. Supp. 724, 729 (D. Hawaii, 1965).
74. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 727 (1964).
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votes in the most populous districts.7 5 The Supreme Court in Lonzenzo76 found
(and disapproved) a ratio of 3.9:1 for the New York Senate and 21:1 for the
Assembly based on the existing apportionment formula. The federal district
court in affirming reapportionment Plan A found satisfactory ratios of 1.15:1
for the Senate and 1.21:1 for the Assembly. 77 In Schaefer v. Thomson,7 8 the dis-
trict court pronounced as invidiously discriminatory a proposed state Senate
apportionment embodying a 10:1 ratio. An extreme variance is exemplified in
the California state Senate districts; the district court noted that the ratio was
450:1 and denied any attempt to justify such a disparity.7 9 At the other end of
the spectrum, the district court refused to approve a reapportionment plan for
the Nebraska legislature solely on the ground that the population variance ratio
was only 1.6:1.80 A reapportionment of the Minnesota legislature resulting in a
ratio of 4:1 for the state Senate and 7:1 for the House was rejected by the dis-
trict court.8 ' A ratio of approximately 20:1 for New Jersey Senate districts
prompted the state court to require immediate redistricting.82 Patent malappor-
tionment was found by the district court in the Missouri. House of Representa-
tives where one legislator represented as few as 4000 people and another legis-
lator represented as many as 50,250, a ratio of 12.5:1.83
The deviation from the norm test was applied in the Nebraska case8 4 to
bar a plan which resulted in five out of fifty districts exceeding the norm and in
six districts falling short of the norm by more than 15 per cent. In the Missouri
decision, the district court struck down a reapportionment statute which would
have permitted a deviation from the quotient or norm of 25 per cent. 85 In
Toombs v. Fortson,"0 the district court found deviations of minus 36.9 per cent
to plus 24 per cent in a proposed apportionment for the Georgia House. The
language of the opinion indicates that this court would place more emphasis on
compliance with the range of deviation test than with the population variance
75. 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
76. 377 U.S. 633, 648 (1964).
77. 238 F. Supp. 916, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
78. 240 F. Supp. 247 (D. Wyo. 1964).
79. Silver v. Jordan, 241 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Cal. 1965). The court remarked at 582:
"Defendants' contention that population is not-the only basis for apportioning of seats in the
State Senate and that a diffusion of political power between uiban and rural-areas is per-
missible cannot be sustained, as such-a, position is the antithesis of the doctrine which
Reynolds v. Sims ... and all its companion cases have established."
80. . League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh,.242 F. Supp, 357 (D. Neb. 1965). The
court placed more reliance on the deviation from the norm test than the-variance ratio, but
seemed to place greatest emphasis on its evaluation of the overall effect of the proposed plan.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey approved an interim reapportionment plan for-the state
legislature which embodied a population variance ratio of 1.6:1. Jackman v. Bodine, (Sup.
Ct. of New Jersey, No. A.-137, April 23, 1965):
81. Honsey v. Donovan, 236 F. Supp. 8, 19 (D. Minn. 1964).
82. N.Y. Times, April 1, 1965, p. 39, col. 4.
83. Jonas v. Hearnes, 236 F. Supp. 699, 705 (W.D. Mo. 1964)
84. League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 242 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Neb. 1965).
85. Jonas v. Hearnes, 236 F. Supp. 699, 707 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
86. 241 F. Supp. 65, 70 and Appendix B (N.D. Ga. 1965).
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ratio, and that it would not condone departures from the norm in excess of 15
per cent.s
7
The test based on the minimum percentage of population which could elect
a majority (and hence control the legislature) was applied by the Supreme
Court to the New York legislature under the present constitutional formula. The
Court found that the proportions of 41.8 per cent for the Senate and 34.7 per
cent for the Assembly indicated unconstitutional apportionment. 8 Under the
legislature's Plan A, the proportions would be 49.4 per cent for the Senate and
49.3 per cent for the Assembly.80 The Colorado (lower house) proportion which
was not disapproved or expressly affirmed by the Supreme Court was 45.1 per
cent. 0 In the Minnesota case, 39.1 per cent for the upper chamber and 35 per
cent for the lower house were unacceptable to the court.0 '
The figures in the preceding paragraphs illustrate the mathematical measure-
ments the courts have utilized in testing the compliance of state legislative re-
apportionment proposals with the equal protection mandate. 92 One can deduce
that a population variance ratio of 2:1 will not pass muster, that a percentage
electing a majority of less than 45 per cent (Lucas) may not be acceptable,
and that deviations exceeding plus or minus 15 per cent may also invalidate a
plan.
These same tests are being applied to county and other local governments.
An approximation of their results for Erie County reveals the dimensions of its
present malapportionment. Erie County has a population variance ratio of
54.9:1,93 deviations from the norm of 10 per cent to 533 per cent 4 and a propor-
tion capable of electing a majority of supervisors of 26 per cent.05 Thus, if the
established tests are applied by a court to Erie County, there is little doubt that
the present scheme of representation will be declared unconstitutional.
The three major tests for measuring compliance with the Reynolds standard
are easy to apply, and quickly bring to light the extreme incidences of malappor-
tionment. Can the tests be satisfactorily correlated? In a close case, reliance on
87. "We decline to set a mathematical formula to be followed but we do hold that a
variance of more than 15 percent would be difficult, if not impossible, to justify. It may
be that there will be some later elucidation by the Supreme Court on this complex question
but until such event occurs, we will base any test as to the reasonableness of variances on
the departure figure of 15 percent." Id. at 70.
88. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 647 (1964).
89. 238 F. Supp. 916, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
90. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 727 (1964).
91. Honsey v. Donovan, 236 F. Supp. 8, 19 (D. Minn. 1964).
92. For an elaboration of measurement devices, see Schubert & Press, Measuring Mal-
apportionment, 58 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 302 (1964).
93. Based on 1960 census figures, Tonawanda (the most populous district) has 105,032
people and Wales (the least populous district) has 1,910 people. Therefore the variance is
105,032:1,910 or 54.9:1. See Appendix, Table I.
94. The present norm is 19,685. The extremes of population deviation from the norm
are found in Wales, 1,910 and Tonawanda, 105,032 (1960 federal census figures).
95. The 28 least populous wards and towns have a total population of 275,086. The
proportion this total bears to the total population of Erie County, 1,063,000 yields the
minimum percentage of population which can, theoretically, elect a majority of supervisors.
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one formula to the exclusion of the others might be decisiveY8 The tests appear
to become more absolute and inflexible with repeated use. Furthermore, they
stifle the exercise of judgment and the consideration of other factors in the elec-
toral process which cannot be calibrated on a percentage scale. Professor Dixon
contends:
An occasional extreme ratio or percentage deviation has no adverse
impact on majority rule; it may be the best way, if not the only way,
to provide effective minority representation along with majority rule 7
V. LocAL REAPPORTIONMENT IN NEW YORK
Chief Justice Warren's formulations of the one-man, one-vote standard in
Reynolds"8 have been interpreted by subsequent litigants antithetically, to insist
on strict numerical equality of votes or to vindicate "... divergences ... based
on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of rational state
policy,... ." Interpretation of the Court's language in recent,-local reapportion-
ment decisions is presented below. In each case, attention is focused on the
"considerations" which have been offered to justify exemption from the standard.
While emphasis is on New York decisions, a few cases from other jurisdictions
are included because-of their precedential value.
The most obvious challenge to the application of Reynolds v. Sims is that
the fourteenth amendment affects only state legislatures. In an early case,
Brouwer v. Bronkema, °00 defendants contended that the equal protection clause
safeguards the equal voice of electors in the choice of state legislators but not
in the choice of a county board, dependent for its existence, powers and mode
of selection on the will of the state legislature. 101 As to such a derivative legis-
lature, plaintiffs had no fundamental right of election. Defendants' second argu-
ment was based on the allegation that the Kent County board was an administra-
tive rather than a legislative body. 0 2 Thirdly, defendants claimed that the
county board was immune from the requirements of the equal protection clause
because some of its members were appointed rather than elected. The court
refused to recognize any of these grounds as a valid reason for non-compliance.
"The State may exercise its legislative powers only in a legislative body appor-
tioned on a population basis'and if it delegates a part of those powers, it must
96. The problem is raised in Tobmbs v. Fortson, 241 F. Supp. 65, 70 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
97. Dixon, op. dct. supra note 6, at 324.
98. 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
99. 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
100. Cir. Ct. Kent County, Mich., No. 1855 (Sept. 11, 1964). (Mimeo.) Following
the Reynolds decision, residents of Grand Rapids brought suit in Kent County, Michigan on
the grounds that they were underrepresented on the county board of supervisors. The gov-
erning constitutional and statutory provisions did not apportion representation on the board
according to an equal population standard.
101. Id. at 9.
102. Compare McMillan v. Wagner, 64 Civ. 2160 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1965) (Mimeo.)
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do so to a legislative body apportioned to the same 'basic constitutional stand-
ard,.,,io3
In Sonneborn v. Sylvester,' °4 a case analogous to Brouwer, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin reached a similar result. It was here argued that the county
legislature derived its powers from statutory rather than from constitutional
sources, and hence was not subject to the equal representation requirement.
The court declared that the rationale of Reynolds "... applies equally as well to
a statutory right to vote . . ."105 and that the fourteenth amendment governs
apportionment of legislatures below the state level.
A three-judge federal court in Bianchi v. Griffing rendered the first decision
applying Reynolds to New York county boards of supervisors. I00 The court,
itself, posed the central questions: "... how far should tle federal judiciary
go, or interest itself, in extending Reynolds v. Sims to local governmental
bodies.. ."?107 And, does the equal protection clause apply
to the method of electing the officials of hamlets, villages, schools fire,
sewerage and water districts, towns, cities or counties . . . or only in
some restricted class of definably important voting occasions. [ ?] 108
The court found no difficulty in drawing an analogy between state and county
representation. It ruled that the Suffolk County board of supervisors, as the
legislative organ of the county, must be representative of population, and that
the apportionment of a local legislature was not a matter solely of state concern.
Defendants did not contest the disparity of representation of the ten towns
of Suffolk, but argued that the voters had approved the apportionment by their
adoption of the Suffolk charter ifi 1958.109 The court rejected this justification,
citing Lucas 0 for the proposition that voter approval could not validate an un-'
constitutional scheme. The egregious inequality of representation (demonstrated
by a population variance ratio of 130:1 and a population proportion of 10 per
cent capable of electing one-half of the board)"' could be corrected by the
state legislature or by a charter -amendment initiated by the voters or by the
Suffolk supervisors.
Following the Bianchi decision,'the courts of the state of New York became
the forum for litigating the constitutionality of several county representation
systems. Defendant state and local officials in Goldstein v. Rockefeller112 urged
103. Brouwer v. Bronkema i Cir. Ct. Kent County, Mich., No. 1855 (Sept. 11, 1964) ati3.
- 104. State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965).
105. Id. at 55, 132 N.W.2d at 255.
106. Bianchi v. Griffing, 238 F. Supp. 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
107. Id. at 1000.
108. Id. at 999.
109. N.Y.L. 1958, ch. 278. Section 201 of the Suffolk Charter provides that the county
board is to consist of a supervisor from each town. Section 203 provides that each supervisor
shall have one vote.
110. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964).
111. Bianchi v. Griffing, 238 F. Supp. 997, 1000, 1004 n.6 (1965).
112. 45 Misc.2d 778, 257 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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no grounds for exemption of the Monroe County board of supervisors from the
equal representation standard." 3 In this action for a declaratory judgment, the
New York supreme court ruled on several points affecting state statutes as well
state constitutional provisions. Present apportionment of Monroe County was
held violative of the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution and
sections 1 and 11 of article I of the New York Constitution.1 14 The court also
declared that section 150 of the New York County Law ("the supervisors in
the several cities and towns ... shall constitute the board of supervisors of the
county") was unconstitutional as its application resulted in the current com-
position of the Monroe County board of supervisors.115
The apportionment of the county board of Broome County was challenged
in Augostini v. Lasky, decided in July, 1965.116 Plaintiffs moved for summary
judgment to declare present representation and voting on the board unconstitu-
tional and to declare sections 150117 and 153118 of the New York County Law
and section 11119 of the New York Second Class Cities Law void. Defendants
(board of supervisors) contended that the New York supreme court lacked
jurisdiction since the complaint presented a federal question. The court refuted
this argument in the following terms:
no reason or justification exists for differentiating, so far as that
right [equal representation] is concerned, between the general govern-
mental business carried on in the highest legislative organs of the State
and that conducted, by virtue of a delegation of authority, in munic-
ipal law-making bodies.
120
Defendants in Augostini further alleged as an affirmative defense that
measures to correct malapportionment had been submitted to the voters of
Broome County in 1963 and 1964 and that the electorate had "soundly defeated"
such proposals. The court dismissed the argument summarily.121 The court also
concluded that section 150 of the County Law and section 11 of the Second Class
Cities Law, as applied to Broome County, violated the fourteenth amendment.
122
The extension of the Reynolds standard to municipal legislatures in New
113. The Monroe board of supervisors parallels the structure of the Erie County Board:
one large town accounting for the largest segment of population, a major city divided into
wards, and sparsely populated towns. Each ward and town elects one member to the board.
The population variance ratio is 24:1. Twenty-five per cent of the population can theo-
retically elect a majority of supervisors. 45 Misc. 2d at 782, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
114. Guaranteeing the right to vote and equal protection.
115. Goldstein v. Rockefeller, 45 Misc. 2d 778, 788, 257 N.Y.S.2d 994, 1006 (Sup. Ct.
1965).
116. 46 Misc. 2d 1058, 262 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
117. Providing that the supervisors of the towns and cities constitute the county board
of supervisors.
118. Providing that action by the county board shall be based on affirmative vote of
a majority of the total board membership.
119. Providing for the election of a supervisor from each city ward.
120. Augostini v. Laskay, 46 Misc. 2d 1058, 1060, 262 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
121. Referring to Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 736
(1964).
122. The court noted that 20 per cent of the county's population could elect a majority
of supervisors.
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York was foreshadowed by the county cases. The groundwork was also laid by
the three-judge federal court decision in Ellis v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore.123 In that case, disparities of district population produced representa-
tion ratios which denied the electorate equally weighted votes in the selection
of city legislators. In Seaman v. Fedourich,24 the apportionment of the Common
Council of Binghamton, New York was at issue. The established voting pro-
cedure in Binghamton paralleled that of New York county boards of supervisors;
each councilman represented one ward, and each exercised one vote regardless
of ward population.
Defendants' threshold contention that the supreme court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the apportionment of a city legislature was rebuffed by
the trial court.' 25 It proceeded to the substantive constitutional issue and con-
cluded that Binghamton's existing representation scheme was invalid. 120 Coun-
cilmanic elections were barred pending the submission of a plan that would satisfy
the Reynolds standard.
This decision of the supreme court prompted the Common Council of Bing-
hamton to adopt Local Law No. 1 (1965) which reapportioned representation
on the basis of new councilmanic districts. The same court was asked by the
plaintiffs to declare the new law unconstitutional on the grounds that it, like its
predecessor, did not satisfy the judicial standard of equal protection. 12 7 The
defendants (a majority of the Council) justified the new plan as one which
honored "natural, geographic subdivisions," and reflected population changes
since the last federal census.'
28
The question of whether or not statistical data, unofficially procured, may
support a reapportionment plan became a sharp issue. The trial court refused
to accept anything but the federal census as evidence of population distribu-
tion.129 The defendants' adjustments to the 1960 census figures (reflecting their
estimates of population flow in and out of wards) were rejected. Neither would
the court permit exclusion of State Hospital inmates from the count of resi-
dents.' 30 Secondly, the trial court brushed aside the consideration of "natural,
geographic subdivisions" where its effect was to subvert population equality. 131
123. 234 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md. 1964).
124. Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444, affirtming
23 A.D.2d 963, 259 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (3d Dep't), affirming 46 Misc. 2d 289, 258 N.Y.S.2d 1008
(Sup. Ct. 1965).
125. 45 Misc. 2d 940, 941-42, 258 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
126. The ninth ward has a population of 542, the fourth ward, 11,426 based on 1960
census figures. The court applied the "least percentage" test and found that 27 per cent of
the population could theoretically elect a majority of the Council. Id. at 943, 258 N.Y.S.2d
at 155.
127. Seaman v. Fedourich, 46 Misc. 2d 289, 258 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
128. Id. at 290, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
129. Id. at 292, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 1011.
130. Id. at 291, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 1011. Compare the Virginia apportionment case, Davis
v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 691 (1964) in which defendants sought unsuccessfully to exclude
military personnel.
131. Id. at 292, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 1011.
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These attempts in the trial court to assuage the rigor of Reynolds were, there-
fore, unsuccessful.
The appellate division and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court
decision in Seaman.132 The Court of Appeals deemed the constitutional issue
settled and addressed itself to the collateral point of population data. It agreed
with the trial court that a local representation plan must achieve substantial
district equality based on the latest official census figures. The significance of
the opinion, however, lies in the Court's criticism of the mathematical per-
formance of the redistricting proposal whether measured on the basis of 1960
census figures or on the basis of defendants' adjusted figures.
Using the 1960 figures, the Court of Appeals found a population variance
ratio of 2:1, and, with specific reference to this ratio, unanimously declared the
proposed reapportionment unconstitutional'. 33 Calculations based on the data
available in the opinion yield a minimum percentage capable of electing a major-
ity of 49 per cent, and a range of deviation of 73 per cent to 145 per cent. The
49 per cent result for the second test looks quite favorable; but it may not be a
reliable indicium in this case because the small number of districts (seven) might
tend to magnify the significance of the middle district. On the basis of the pop-
ulation variance and deviation tests, however, the reapportionment clearly fails
to come within the limits established by federal court decisions.
In its dictum, the Court of Appeals expressed disapproval of the Bingham-
ton redistricting even when tested on the basis of the controverted population
data put forward by the defendants.' 34 These adjusted figures show smaller inter-
district discrepancies than the federal census revealed. The population variance
test results in a 1.4:1 ratio; deviations from the norm are 83 per cent to 115
per cent. 35 If the dictum may be interpreted as a disapproval of these results,
the Court is applying criteria more severe than those in Lucas and subsequent
cases. Is the Court maintaining that in a relatively small, compact area (such
as the city of Binghamton) there is no justification for relatively minimal de-
viations and that the equal population standard will be more strictly enforced
for municipalities than it is for state or county units?
One additional development in the New York application of the Reynolds
standard must be noted; it reaches beyond legislative apportionment and
districting. The federal district court in McMillan v. Wagner& 3 6 has held that
administrative bodies created by the state must comply with the one-man,
one-vote requirement. The Board of Estimates of the City of New York as con-
stituted permitted equal votes by borough presidents irrespective of the popu-
lations they represented. Respondents sought immunity from the standard on
132. 23 A.D.2d 963, 259 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778,
262 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1965).
133. 16 N.Y.2d at 103, 209 N.E.2d at 783, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
134. Ibid.
135. Calculations are based on the figures given in the opinion; 16 N.Y.2d at 100, 209
N.E.2d at 781, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
136. 64 Civ. 2160 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1965) (Mimeo.)
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the ground that the City Charter vests legislative power in the City Council and
that the Board of Estimates is primarily concerned with aiding the Mayor in
directing the business affairs of the City. Since there was no delegation of legis-
lative power to the Board, so the argument ran, its apportionment need not
comply with the fourteenth amendment.
The district court noted the powers vested in the Board (appropriations,
budget, zoning, etc.) and observed that even if these were not legislative powers
they were governmental powers and were delegated by the state. The legislative
versus administrative classification, stated the court, was specious. For in Gray
v. Sanders, the Supreme Court had declared that each citizen is entitled to a
vote of equal weight for state governor. "No state office could be more clearly
executive-administrative, and not legislative, than that of governor."' 37 There-
fore, the right of a New York City resident to equal representation on a quasi-
legislative or administrative body is no less than the right to equal representa-
tion in the state legislature.
The New York decisions reviewed above are of one voice in proclaiming
that the equal protection clause reaches at least the county and city levels of
government, and quite possibly beyond. The constitutional analysis in Brouwer
lays the foundations for further extension. The question raised in Bianchi-
does the fourteenth amendment penetrate to every hamlet and fire district-is
not academic. If the state empowers any elective (or partially elective) agency
to discharge governmental functions, the constitutional right to equal represen-
tation becomes, automatically, controlling. Furthermore, in these decisions there
was no dilution of the strict population standard in its application to local, gov-
ernmental bodies.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
What principles can be extracted or extrapolated from recent decisions to
serve as guides for formulating a permanent reapportionment plan? The old,
Ccommon sense" standard that districts be composed of compact, contiguous
areas still applies. The "good faith" standard has not been abandoned and has
been a basis for invalidating plans designed to protect the seats of incumbents.
The courts have also indicated that they will appraise a plan in its totality; this
criterion has appeared where a balancing of discrepancies might be justified in
a bicameral reapportionment. But the standard which now overrides all other
considerations is that the votes throughout an electoral unit must be of equal
weight.
It is too early to conclude, on sound legal grounds, that a system based on
multi-member districts or elections at-large will be overturned, for both devices
are compatible with an equality-of-votes standard. It is not premature, however,
to caution that a combined single- and multi-member district scheme may be
found to deny the electors in the multi-member districts an equal opportunity
137. Id. at 13.
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to achieve representation. Single-member districting still remains the most effec-
tive method to reflect community interests and to contribute to the viability of
our two-party system.
Fractional and weighted voting,138 while countenanced by a few courts as'a
temporary compromise will probably be invalidated as an adulteration of the
Reynolds standard. The trinity of one-man, one-vote, one-voice is already dis-
cernible in the doctrinal firmament.
How will a proposed reapportionment be evaluated by the courts? Three
major tests have been employed: the population variance ratio, the minimum
percentage of voters capable of electing a majority of the legislative body and
the deviation from the norm tests. No court has ventured to lay down the exact
mathematical performance that will be required.: In Lucas, a 1.7:1 variance was
arguably acceptable; but in one recent New York case, Sedaman v. Fedourich, the
dictum points to disapproval of a 1.4:1 ratio.' 39 For the second test, we can
assume that the result should be within a few percentage points of 50 per cent.
The deviation from the norm test is formulated to allow a permissible range of
85 per-cent to 115 per cent. Most courts do not apply all of the three'tests; they
also vary in the emphasis placed on the results of any one of the tests. However,
the population variance ratio appears to be the measure most frequently used.
It would be clearly inadvisable to exceed the Lucar ratio. '
What are the.prospects for an early judicial retreat from the mathematical
battlements erected by Reynolds? None appear in sight. Subsequent decisions
have applied and re-applied formulae with little, if any, flexibility. The basic
drive-toward equality of voting power-is right and over-due; but its expres-
sion in mechanical forms which permit no weighing of competing values dis-
criminates against important, non-numerical elements involved in representative
government. Such an approach makes no allowance for the functional interrela-
tionship of different levels of government or for the responsibility, in a democracy,
to heed pressing, minority views. It is difficult, or even impossible, to give con-
sideration to these factors and, at the same time, to draw districts of equal
population. Where a district plan includes but a few extreme deviations, mathe-
matical comparisons using a weighted system might reveal that the discrepancies,
over-all, are unsubstantial.
At the present time, arguments addressed to the preservation of historic
political subdivisions have no chance of success where a proposed plan does not
meet the tests. It is, therefore, a problem of political ingenuity to draw boundaries
which dissect as few counties and towns as possible but which, at the same time,
enclose approximately equal segments of population. This must be done if there
is merit in salvaging at least some community representation. The expectation
that a lesser degree of compliance might be demanded in local districting (as
138. Banzbaf, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 Rutgers
L. Rev. 317 (1965).
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opposed to congressional or state districting) has not materialized. In fact, a
unicameral county or city legislature may be held to a higher standard; there is
no second chamber to compensate for discrepancies in equality of representation.
In small, compact units of government, the trend might follow the opinion in
Seaman, that even allegedly "minor" deviations will not be tolerated. Since the
courts have not mitigated the standard to preserve the county as a unit of rep-
resentation, it can hardly be expected that city wards will be the object of judi-
cial indulgence.
The long-range prospects for the Supreme Court's return to its traditionally
more flexible approach are not so dim. Flawless, mathematical equality of dis-
tricts does not guarantee meaningful representation. There are some adumbra-
tions in the cases that the equal protection clause may harbor more than a
quantitative guarantee. It is not inconceivable that a situation might arise in
which a representation plan is computer-perfect, 40 but the district map reveals
such blatant gerrymandering that it would be at least improbable that the legis-
lative body could fairly reflect the electorate. If the issue is sidestepped in such
a case (as it has been in past cases involving allegations of gerrymandering) it
cannot be indefinitely ignored. For while the Court's concern with the right of
the electorate to choose a genuinely representative government is now confined
primarily to numbers, it has by no means emerged from the political thicket.
140. Nagel, Simplified Bipartisan Computer Redistricting, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 863 (1965).
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APPENDIX
PRESENT AND PROPOSED APPORTIONMENT OF ERIE COUNTY'
An analysis of the population represented by each of the 54 members of the
Erie County board of supervisors reveals an advanced stage of malapportion-
ment. Approximately one-half of the total population of 1,063,000 resides in the
city of Buffalo, the other half in outlying towns and two cities. The voting figures
show that Buffalo is two-thirds Democratic and that the towns are two-thirds
Republican. Therefore, an equipoise of both population distribution and political
affiliation characterizes Erie County.
The first of the tables that follow summarizes the application of the three
mathematical tests to present county apportionment. In each case, the results
far exceed the permissible range of inter-district disparity.
Proposed Plans I and II suggest possible schemes of districting for the
towns and cities outside Buffalo. No plan is advanced for district boundaries
within Buffalo since the author has not studied the characteristics of the wards
and since, generally, ward lines have been less inflexible and resistant to change
than town lines.
Plan I is predicated on a ten-member board of supervisors, Plan II on a
twenty-six member board. A different theory of legislative function inheres in
each plan. The first accords with the preference for.a.small, deliberative body
whose members are in close communication on all problems of administration and
policy. The second Plan relies on the operation of a committee system for effec-
tive deliberation by smaller groups.
Neither the present nor the future administration of Erie County would
seem to demand a legislative body larger than a twenty-six member board. A
body of such size can reflect present communities of interest and operate
efficiently.
TABLE I*
APPLICATION OF TESTS TO
PRESENT APPORTIONMENT OF ERIE COUNTY
54 Member Board of Supervisors
Total Population:
Population of Buffalo:
Population outside of Buffalo:
Population Variance Ratio:
(Most populous district, Town of
Tonawanda,105,032;
Least populous district, Town
of Wales, 1,910)
Least Percentage Electing a Majority:
(Proportion of 28 least populous
wards and towns to total
county population)
Range of Deviations from the Norm:
(Norm - 19,685. Extreme deviations,








* Population figures for all Tables are based on the federal census of 1960.
TABLE II
PROPOSED PLAN I
10 Member Board of Supervisors
Nulmber of Sunervisors ner District1
Vote per Supervisor
Districts within Buffalo
Districts outside of Buffalo
District Norm
Composition of Five Districts Outside of Buffalo
One - Tonawanda
Two - Grand Island, City of Tonawanda,
Amherst, Clarence
Three - Cheektowaga, Lancaster
Four - Lackawanna, West Seneca,
Hamburg
Five - Orchard Park, Evans, Brant,
Eden, North Collins, Collins,
Concord, Sardinia, Boston,
Colden, Holland, Wales, Aurora,
Elma, Marilla, Alden, Newstead
Six to Ten - Buffalo
Population Variance Ratio (for five districts
outside Buffalo) = 1.05:1
Range of Deviations from the Norm (for five













26 Member Board of Supervisors,
Number of Supervisors per District 1
Vote per Supervisor 1
Districts within Buffalo 13
Districts Outside of Buffalo 13
District Norm 40,885
Composition of Thirteen Districts Outside of Buffalo
One - Tonawanda (part) 38,000
Two - Tonawanda (part) 38,000
Three - Tonawanda (remainder) 29,032
Grand Island 9,607
38,639
Four - City of Tonawanda 21,561
Amherst (part) 20,800
42,361
Five - Amherst (remainder) 42,037
Six - Cheektowaga (32) 42,028
Seven - Cheektowaga (Y) 42,028
Eight - Lackawanna 29,564
West Seneca (part) 10,000
39,564
Nine - West Seneca (remainder) 23,644
Orchard Park 15,876
39,520
Ten - Clarence, Newstead, Lancaster 44,697
Eleven - Hamburg 41,288
Twelve - Alden, Elma, Marilla, Aurora,
Wales, Colden, Holland, Boston 41,927
Thirteen - Evans, Brant, Eden, North Collins,
Collins, Concord, Sardinia 40,384
530,473
Fourteen to Twenty-Six - Buffalo
Population Variance Ratio (for thirteen
districts outside Buffalo) 1.18:1
Range of Deviations from the Norm (for
thirteen districts outside Buffalo) 93% to 109%
